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Editor's Shelf
From Parameters, Autumn 2000, pp. 136-37.

The reprinting of Stephen Ambrose's Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point (Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1999) reminds us once again of our nation's history and the contribution of the United States Military Academy
at West Point. In his foreword, President Dwight D. Eisenhower alluded to "how little some things change," but in fact
there have been unprecedented changes in the decades since Ambrose penned the original manuscript. That is precisely
why this reprint of the classic is worth the modest investment. General Andrew J. Goodpaster (51st Superintendent)
has provided a wonderfully complete and moving afterword to bring the manuscript up to date. His detailed account of
the Academy's tranquil and turbulent times since the mid-1960s serves not only to provide a historical context, but to
remind the reader of the many underlying principles that have accounted for the institution's and its graduates' success.
Throughout history every great nation has kept in its treasure-chest an academy for advanced learning and military
training. Steven Ambrose's history leaves the reader with a greater understanding of the relationship between our
treasure, West Point, and the society it supports.
When I reintroduced the "Editor's Shelf," I mentioned one of its functions was to provide our readers with a broader
range and greater number of book reviews. I also alluded to the fact that often a book is initially overlooked or simply
not provided by the publisher, or that in some rare cases a reviewer is not able to complete the review. The latter
applies to Robert S. McNamara, James Blight, Robert Bringham, Thomas Biersteker, and Colonel (Ret.) Herbert
Schandler's collaborative work Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (Public Affairs,
1999). When our staff received the paperback reprint of the book, we immediately recognized it as a work that had
been commissioned to Colonel (Ret.) Harry Summers for review. Those who are friends of the Army War College and
the military are aware of Harry's untimely death on 14 November 1999. Argument Without End is a product of Robert
McNamara and his colleagues finally having the opportunity to meet with their Vietnamese counterparts in seven
unprecedented conferences in Italy and Vietnam to discuss many of the issues surrounding the war. The result is an
introspective analysis of the decisions on both sides that placed North Vietnam and the United States on a collision
course. Unfortunately, the style of the manuscript, with the former Secretary writing introductions and conclusions for
many of the chapters, encourages rationalizing hindsight. Most readers would appreciate an unbiased analysis of the
"missed opportunities" and the reasons for the lack of communication; however, Mr. McNamara's willingness to share
the blame with the North Vietnamese and other third parties comes across as just that--an attempt to share blame. In
fairness to Mr. McNamara, one must acknowledge that he knowingly sets himself up for criticism and in a number of
cases it is self-inflicted. Serious students of the military art and history will find the book revealing and a work that
should be kept on the shelf for referencing "how not to conduct a war." I hope Harry would agree.
The George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, has initiated a series of
"Marshall Center Papers" focused on comparative and interdisciplinary topics, including international security and
democratic defense management, civil military relations, strategy formulation, defense planning, arms control,
peacekeeping, crisis management, and cooperative security. The first in the series is authored by Dr. Peter van Ham
and is entitled Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia. Dr. van Ham's
monograph sets the tone for the series with his overview of the future for European defense capabilities. His analysis
takes the reader to the heart of the contradiction between "Common European Security and Defense Policy" and the
maintenance of a strong transatlantic alliance. Parameters commends the Marshall Center for initiating this series and
heartily endorses Dr. van Ham's effort to all concerned with the continuation of the US-European relationship.
Lieutenant General William E. Odom, USA Ret., has produced what is being touted as the seminal work on the demise
of the Soviet military with his The Collapse of the Soviet Military (Yale University Press, 2000). The author's
background at the National Security Agency and as a key member of the Carter and Reagan administrations qualifies
him to analyze and chronicle the rapid demise of what was at the time the world's second greatest military power. The
author postulates that it was the relationship of the military to Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leader's hatred for the

top-heavy and sluggish military that ensured its demise. Odom concludes that the rapidity of the Soviet military's fall
was a surprise even to Gorbachev despite his avid campaign against it. Drawing on interviews with key actors in the
Soviet hierarchy, Odom surmises that perestroika's destruction of the party-state foreordained the collapse of the
Soviet armed forces. The author's analysis of Soviet war philosophy, including the theories of Marx and Lenin that
decreed the necessity for a huge military and Gorbachev's reduction initiatives, leads the reader to conclude that the
collapse of the Soviet military was inevitable. It is ironic that what is destined to be one of the most complete and
introspective accounts of the demise of the Soviet military is authored by an individual who served as one of its
greatest enemies.
Often in the race to record and exploit history authors are swept up in the maelstrom of the obvious. Certainly that has
been true since the 50th anniversary of World War II. The number of mediocre books, monographs, and articles
surrounding the war, and more especially D-Day, is approaching infinity. In what many have dubbed the most
thoroughly researched and detailed book on the war, Lieutenant Colonel James Jay Carafano breaks that trend toward
mediocrity in his excellent work After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout. Following the Normandy
invasion, Allied armies had been stalled on or near the beaches for weeks. Finally, US forces were able to break the
German stranglehold in Operation Cobra. The author refutes previous appraisals of some of America's greatest
generals and credits the imaginative leadership and operational flexibility of the junior officers, noncommissioned
officers, and individual soldiers for the success of the operation that put the Allies on the road to Berlin. Carafano
captures all the intensity and realism associated with the individual battles that made up Operation Cobra by including
a number of eyewitness accounts. The reader benefits from the author's superior ability to fashion the imagery of the
battle, and it's a good thing, because there are no pictures to add insight and the maps are few. However, that being
said, this readable and revealing book is a must for any student of World War II and military history desiring an
unbiased appraisal of the actions that changed the course of the Normandy campaign. -- RHT
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